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We stand at an unprecedented moment in the history of ex-
clusive private rights in information ("EPRIs").' Technology has
made it possible, it seems, to eliminate to a large extent one aspect
of what makes information a public good-its nonexcludability. A
series of laws-most explicitly the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act ("DMCA") and the Uniform Computers Information Transac-
tions Act ("UCITA")-are building on new technologies for control-
ling individual uses of information goods to facilitate a perfect en-
closure of the information environment.
The purpose of this Essay is to explain why economic justifi-
cations interposed in favor of this aspect of the enclosure movement
are, by their own terms, undetermined. There is no a priori theo-
retical basis to claim that these laws would, on balance, increase
the social welfare created by information production. The empirical
work that could, in principle, predict the direction in which more
perfect enclosure will move us has not yet been done. Empirical re-
search that has been done on the effects of expanded EPRIs-in the
* Associate Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. Thanks to Jamie
Boyle, Mark Geistfeld, Neil Netanel, and Steve Shavell for helpful conversations and comments.
The title is meant to recall the wisdom of Benjamin Kaplan's cautionary An Unhurried View of
Copyright (1966) at the dawn of the enclosure movement.
1. I introduce here the term '"PRIs" to denote the panoply of rights we have been refer-
ring to in the last decade and a half as Intellectual Property Rights or IPRs. The term "property"
is so heavily laden with an intellectual baggage created for normal dconomic goods that it often
obscures more than it reveals about the collection of complex rules that our society has adopted
to harness some market actors to provide what is essentially a public good-information. 'x-
clusive private rights in information" is functionally accurate and more analytically neutral.
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context of patents-is quite agnostic as to the proposition that
EPRIs are generally beneficial, except in very specific industries or
markets.2 We are, in other words, embracing this new legal frame-
work for information production and exchange on faith. Given the
tremendous non-economic losses-in terms of concentration and
commercialization of information production and homogenization of
the information produced 3-that a perfectly enclosed information
environment imposes on our democracy and our personal autonomy,
such a leap of faith is socially irresponsible, and, as I have argued
elsewhere at great length, probably unconstitutional.
4
It used to be that the distribution technology of information
goods was such that once they were uttered-say, a copy of a book
was released-the owner could do little to prevent significant dis-
semination of the information by the holder of the medium of the
utterance. One could lend the book to a friend, quote passages, or
make photocopies, for example, without the owner being able, as a
practical matter, to do anything about it. Information goods were,
2. See WESLEY M. COHEN ET AL., PROTECTING THEIR INTELLECTUAL ASSETS:
APPROPRIABILITY CONDITIONS AND WHY U.S. MANUFACTURING FIRMS PATENT (OR NOT), (Na-
tional Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 7552, 2000) available at
http://papers.nber.org/papers.html (reporting on most comprehensive survey data currently
available; finding that patents are the least important means of appropriating the benefits of
innovation, relative to secrecy and lead time, and suggesting that much patenting in most indus-
tries (except pharmaceuticals and medical equipment) is intended defensively, against strategic
use of patents by competitors, and not to appropriate the benefits of innovation); BRONWYN H.
HALL & ROSE MARIE HAM, THE PATENT PARADOX REVISITED: DETERMINANTS OF PATENTING IN
THE US SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY, 1980-94, (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Pa-
per No. 7062, 1999), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers.html (reporting similar findings
for the semiconductor industry specifically, noting the potential efficacy, nonetheless, of facili-
tating entry into niche product markets); ADAM B. JAFFE, THE U.S. PATENT SYSTEM IN
TRANSITION: POLICY INNOVATION AND THE INNOVATION PROCESS, (National Bureau of Econ.
Research Working Paper No. 7280, 1999), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers.html (sur-
veying the empirical literature regarding the enhancement of patent in the past two decades,
and finding that few robust conclusions could be drawn as to the effect of enhanced property
rights on innovation).
3. I have described these effects in detail in Yochai Benkler, Intellectual Property and the
Organization of Information Production (MS 1999), http://www.law.nyu.edu/benklery/Ipec.pdf.
4. See Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection: The Role of Judicial
Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
535 (2000) [hereinafter Benkler, Constitutional Bounds]; Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to
Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L,
REV. 354 (1999). My work follows that of many others. See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE
AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996); Keith Aoki,
(Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1293 (1996); Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics:
Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853 (1991); Niva Elkin-
Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach To Copyright Law In Cyberspace,
14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215 (1996).
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in this sense, partially nonexcludable-to some extent the owner
could not exclude others from making valuable use of the work, and
to that extent could not capture the social benefit created by the
work. Goods that have this attribute are public goods in the limited
sense that they will be underproduced if produced solely by private
parties, because some of their social benefits are external to the
producer.
Encryption technology makes it possible, at least in princi-
ple, for owners of information goods perfectly to control access to,
and use of, their products. With the right legal background, say
some, encryption could solve the public goods problem of informa-
tion production. We could prohibit decryption of technical measures
that control access to works, and enforce contracts made among
private parties regarding the use of information goods. This would
introduce a regime of private agreements regarding the price and
terms of access to creative works, which would be more efficient
than subjecting all information transactions to uniform background
laws. The legal implementations of this optimism are the DMCA's
anticircumvention and antidevice provisions, and the UCITA's en-
forcement of mass-market cickwrap licenses, including license
terms that give vendors greater rights to control access to or use of
the work licensed than general copyright law gives them.
There are three types of "economic" arguments in favor of
the laws that support encryption and licensing as means of dis-
placing background copyright law with private agreements. The
first, which one might call the simplistic argument, is that if ven-
dors can charge for all uses valuable to users, then users can use
price signaling to signal vendors what information they value. Pro-
ducers will respond by increasing production of what consumers are
willing to pay for. The result is that the market will produce the
type and quantity of information that consumers actually want, just
as an ideal market produces any other economic good.
The simplistic argument in favor of encryption and licens-
ing-to the extent it claims to be an economic argument-is wrong.
Information is a true public good in the strict economic sense. It is
not only nonexcludable, it is also nonrival. We say of a good that it
is nonrival when its consumption by one person does not make it
any less available for its consumption by another. Once such a good
is produced, no more social resources need be invested in creating
more of it to satisfy the next consumer. Apples are rival. If I eat
this apple, you cannot eat it. If you nonetheless want to eat an ap-
ple, more resources need to be diverted from, say, building chairs,
to growing apples, to satisfy you. The social cost of your consuming
20001 2065
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the second apple is the cost of not using the resources needed to
grow the second apple in their next best use-if you will, it is the
cost to society of not having the additional chairs that could have
been made from the apple tree. Information is nonrival. Once Tol-
stoy has written War and Peace, he need not spend any more time
on it because fifty million people want to read it than he would to
satisfy one reader.5 The degree to which a good is or is not rivalrous
is a fact of nature-a thing either does, or does not have this un-
usual attribute that, once produced, many can enjoy it without
added cost. Every good can be defined on a spectrum between a per-
fect economic good-which is rival and excludable, and a perfect
public good-which is nonrival and nonexcludable. Information is
generally understood to be perfectly nonrival and partially nonex-
cludable. 6
The simplistic defense of encryption and contracts as better
than background law fails because it assumes that by changing the
partial nonexcludability to perfect excludability the public goods
problem is solved. It is not. If a good is nonrival, then its marginal
cost-the social cost of making it available for consumption by the
next person-is zero. No private parties will produce that good for
sale at its marginal cost, because "selling" the good at a price of
zero will not allow them to recoup their costs. If, however, private
parties do produce the good because they can exclude all consumers,
and sell it only to those who value it at least at a price that covers
investment in its production-a price that is above its marginal
cost-then the good is being underutilized at the time it is being
sold.
The simplistic defense is, then, "wrong" in the sense that we
know that information is a true public good. If produced purely in
response to positive (above zero) price signals, information will be
produced only in response to consumers who value information at
above its marginal cost. In the standard economic model, however,
we know that a good is being produced and consumed efficiently
only when it is sold at its marginal cost. It is simply inconsistent
with the standard economic understanding of the economics of in-
formation production to say that "the best prescription for connect-
ing authors to their audiences is to extend rights into every corner
5. Communication, on the other hand, is rival. Each book, the trees for pulp, the presses,
the trucks, etc. are all rival and hence economic goods. But the "information" good or cultural
product itself is nonrival.




where consumers derive value from literary and artistic works...
the results should be to promote political as well as cultural diver-
sity, ensuring a plenitude of voices, all with the chance to be
heard."
7
The other two defenses of encryption, licensing enforcement
and generally stronger property rights are not "wrong" in this
sense. They are possibly correct, under some circumstances. But
those who offer these defenses overstate their theoretical determi-
nacy by suggesting that private ordering is systematically prefer-
able to public ordering-to wit, that contracts enforced by law and
technology are better than copyright law. This is too strong a claim.
It may sometimes be the case that private ordering will be prefer-
able to public ordering, but when this will happen is a matter for
empirical evaluation-empirical evaluation that no one has yet per-
formed, and the results of which may be very different for different
types of information goods. Moreover, the two defenses are theoreti-
cally in tension with each other-the "private parties have better
information" defense described in the following paragraph assumes,
albeit implicitly, no significant market power in the hands of ven-
dors. The "price discrimination" defense that I will discuss thereaf-
ter, to the contrary, does assume the presence of market power, and
relies on the efficiency associated with production by a monopolist
that can perfectly price discriminate.8
The first of the two remaining defenses relies on the notion
that private parties know better than government officials-legisla-
tive, judicial, or regulatory-what the correct level of protection is
and what the correct level of access and use at a given price is. We
know, goes the argument, about the public goods problem. We know
that it must be solved by some level of use that is "free", i.e., at
marginal cost, and some level of positively priced use. But no one
knows for sure at a general level, for all transactions, what that
level is. Private parties, goes this claim, are better situated than
government officials to assess where that line should be drawn for
their transaction-whether, for example, there should or should not
be a right to make photocopies for nonprofit educational classroom
7. Paul Goldstein, COPYRIGHT HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX
236 (1994). It is important to note here that I have focused on Goldstein's statement not because
I think he actually defends the simplistic argument, but because his clear statement of it can so
easily be misread to support this argument, and it is very important to assure that it not be so
misread. Goldstein's actual argument is mostly of the second variety of argument that I describe
in the following paragraphs of the text. See id. at 178-79.
8. See James Boyle, Cruel, Mean or Lavish?; Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and
Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007 (2000).
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uses of a given work, released under specific market conditions and
assumptions. Sometimes it will be efficient to make such a use
privileged to users at no cost, other times it will not. The parties,
not the government, know which is which, and which use rights are
more valuable in the hands of vendors or users. This type of defense
has been made by, for example, Easterbrook in a recent essay,9 as
well as more systematically by Merges.' 0
It is quite possible that in many cases private parties will
have better information than public lawmakers about the correct
extent to which they value a given use of a specific work. But re-
member that information goods, if they are sold at a positive price
at all, are being sold at a price above their marginal cost. To the
extent that we observe a transaction for an information good at a
positive price, we are observing a situation where the seller has
"market power" to engage at least to some extent in above marginal
cost pricing.
Terms of use are part of the price. A vendor could price its
product at $10 plus the right to poke fun at the work, or at $5 with
an attached promise not to mock the work. Since we know that
pricing is above marginal cost, and fixed at the profit-maximizing
rate for the vendor (like monopoly pricing), we know that the price,
whatever it is, will not reflect the socially optimal price, but rather
the vendor's privately-optimal price given the elasticity of demand
for its product to changes in the price/terms-of-use bundle at which
it is offered.
In a market where above-marginal-cost-pricing is the rule,
not the exception, the advantage private parties have in informa-
tion over government actors is counterbalanced by our knowledge
that the private parties will reach some suboptimal price, which
could be partly expressed in access and use rights. The question
then becomes empirical, not theoretical. One must compare the
magnitude of the inefficiency introduced by the market power that
EPRIs are designed to give vendors, to the magnitude of the ineffi-
9. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace vs. Property Law? 4 TEX. REV. L. &
POL. 103 (1999).
10. Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the "Newto-
nian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115 (1997); see generally Robert P.
Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Or-
ganizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996) (advocating use of collective rights organizations in-
stead of compulsory licensing to foster expert tailoring of specific transactions and reduced politi.
cal economy problems); Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property and the Costs of Commercial
Exchange, A Review Essay, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1570, 1605-13 (1995) (advocating creation of inte-
grated contract law governing intellectual property-based transactions).
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ciency introduced by the difference in information available to the
government and to the parties to set terms of access. To the extent
we have evidence that the difference in information that public and
private actors possess is large, and the information good is suffi-
ciently substitutable with similar information goods that there is
little market power, private ordering may well outperform public
ordering. But if the public/private information gap is not particu-
larly large, and/or if the vendor has significant market power be-
cause the product does not have close substitutes, then public, not
private ordering will be more efficient. The choice between the two
is empirical, not theoretical, although one would tend to think that
in mass market situations, where the contract is not negotiable, the
comparison of quality of information is largely between the infor-
mation available to the vendor alone-who drafts the contract-and
the government. While the vendor knows its own interests better
than the government, there is no reason to think that it similarly
has an advantage over government with regard to information
about the preferences or valuations of all potential consumers of its
work. It must unilaterally determine the revenue-maximizing price,
in terms of cash and usage, based on standard methods for pre-
dicting the preferences and behavior of large numbers of people-
for example, a market study of consumer preferences. Similar judg-
ments about preferences and behavior will, to a great extent, be the
basis of public decisions regulating access rights. Mass market li-
censes-whose enforcement has been the most controversial aspect
of UCITA-may therefore be the case where private ordering-li-
censing terms-would be least likely to improve on background
rules that legislatures or courts might impose.
The final argument in favor of private ordering, or more per-
fect technological and contractual enclosure, relies on the assump-
tion that information vendors have market power. It relies on the
understanding that a monopolist who is permitted to, and practi-
cally can, perfectly price discriminate, will produce efficiently, un-
like a monopolist who cannot so discriminate." The crux of the de-
fense, to whose questioning the remainder of this Essay is devoted,
is that if introducing strong encryption protection and licensing en-
forcement allows vendors to price discriminate among consumers,
then vendors will produce more efficiently than they will when it is
impracticable for them so to discriminate.
11. See Boyle, supra note 8, at 2021-26.
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The price discrimination argument was made quite plainly
in Judge Easterbrook's opinion in ProCD v. Zeidenberg. There, the
defendant had extracted raw data from the plaintiffs directory and
used it to produce a new directory. Under the relevant Supreme
Court precedent the defendant was privileged so to use the data.
The directory was, however, distributed on a CD-ROM accompanied
by a license that prohibited commercial re-use of the data. The
question before the court, therefore, was whether to enforce the
shrinkwrap license that was included with the CD. Prior law had
largely refused to enforce such licenses, whether for contract law
reasons concerning lack of consent, or for reasons of federal pre-
emption of the state law enforcement of terms that give owners
more rights than the explicitly limited rights granted them under
federal copyright law.12 Beyond the legal analysis, Judge Easter-
brook justified his preference for enforcing the license on the fol-
lowing rationale:
The database is much more valuable to some users than to others. Manufacturers
and retailers pay high prices to specialized information intermediaries for such
mailing lists; ProCD offers a potentially cheaper alternative. People with nothing
to sell could use the database as a substitute for calling long distance information.
.. or just as an electronic substitute for the local phone book. ProCD decided to en-
gage in price discrimination, selling its database to the general public for personal
use at a low price (approximately $150 for the set of five discs) while selling infor-
mation to the trade for a higher price.
If ProCD had to recover all of its costs and make a profit by charging a single
price-that is, if it could not charge more to commercial users than to the general
public-it would have to raise the price substantially over $150. The ensuing re-
duction in sales would harm consumers who value the information at, say, $200.
They get consumer surplus of $50 under the current arrangement but would cease
to buy if the price rose substantially .... To make price discrimination work, how-
ever, the seller must be able to control arbitrage .... Instead of tinkering with the
product and letting users sort themselves-for example, furnishing current data at
a high price that would be attractive only to commercial customers, and two-year-
old data at a low price-ProCD turned to the institution of contract. 13
To see the limitations of this intuitively appealing analysis,
it is necessary to introduce a more technical (though not substan-
tively different) presentation of it.
Recall from the earlier discussion that the owners of EPRIs
price their products above their marginal cost of zero. The pricing
model that is most closely analogous to this kind of "value" pric-
ing-pricing based on how consumers value the product, not on how
12. See Mark A- Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 85 S. CAL. L. REV.
1239, 1248-53 (1995).
13. ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996).
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much producers pay to supply the marginal consumer-is monopoly
pricing, where consumer valuation and elasticity of demand set the
price and quantity at which the monopolist produces the good. The
monopolist sets the price and quantity at the level that will maxi-
mize its profits, without regard to marginal cost. Consumers who
value the good above that price gain consumer welfare. The pro-
ducer gains the remainder of the social welfare generated by con-
sumption of the good by those consumers who value the good at or
above that price. The welfare that would have been gained by con-
sumers in a competitive market-those who value the product
above the marginal cost of providing it to them, but below the mo-
nopolists' revenue maximizing price-is lost to society. This loss is
called "deadweight loss." If, however, a monopolist can sell at one
price to low value users and at a higher price to high value users, it
will do so. This allows the monopolist to sell to more consumers who
value the good at above its marginal cost, thereby reducing dead-
weight loss.
No price discrimination With price discrimination
P P
B
Social welfare (consumer plus producer surplus) represented by checkered area
Deadweight loss represented by area shaded with diagonal lines
A, B: price and quantity at which a product is offered.
B represents the supply of an information good at a lower price than it would
have been supplied in the absence of price discrimination. In Judge
Easterbrook's explanation B marks the availability of the ProCD database
at $150 as opposed to only at a price in the thousands, which is represented
by A in both graphs.
Figure 1: Social welfare benefits of price discrimination in monopoly markets
What is attractive about this story is that if you permit pro-
ducers to appropriate every ounce of social welfare generated by
their production efforts, they will produce at the socially efficient
level, and deadweight loss will be eliminated. If one seeks to cap-
ture some of these social welfare increases for consumers, one can
introduce various means of redistributing this newly created social
20712000]
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welfare from producers to society at large or to certain classes of
deserving users. This is the crux of Fisher's influential discussion of
price-discrimination in information transactions.
14
There are many reasons, external to the model, to think that
this story is less attractive than it might initially seem, mostly con-
cerning the social value of information and its value as a productive
resource. 15 I will not address these types of concern in the space of
this short Essay. Instead, I will explain why internally, accepting
all the methodological assumptions of the model, price discrimina-
tion in the context of information goods cannot a priori be said to
increase social welfare.
Implementing price discrimination is costly. The producer
must invest in identifying discrete market categories that would
bear different prices. It must also take measures-technical, con-
tractual, marketing, or any combination-to prevent arbitrage of
the good from low value users to high value users.
The total cost of implementing price discrimination for a
given category of consumers determines the minimal granularity at
which price discrimination can be implemented. Price discrimina-
tion, if you will, can never be perfect, but is always lumpy. The
product is never sold to each and every consumer at his or her
valuation, but is instead sold in categories the size of which is de-
termined by the costs of identifying and implementing price dis-
crimination for that group of consumers.
The lumpiness of price discrimination is especially important
in information goods, because many users may value the goods at
above their optimal demand price of zero, but below the minimal
supply price, which is equal to the cost of implementing the price
discrimination mechanism to serve them. At the very least this will
equal the cost of identifying who really will not pay anything more
14. See generally William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1203 (1998).
15. See generally Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089, 1101-27 (1998) (exploring the doctrinal foundations of proposed UCC
Article 2B, and arguing that none of the common justifications for private ordering supports
according information providers the broad powers of self-help that they claim as a matter of
right); Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Man-
agement," 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 515-59 (1998) (promoting shaping of information technology
transactions more based on social welfare than on traditional common law contract and property
rules); Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 BERKELEY
TECH. & L.J. 93 (1997); Wendy Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination: Implica-
tions for Contract, 73 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 1367 (1998) (a methodological, not normative, criticism
of the price discrimination argument based on a restatement of intellectual property law gener-
ally as a publicly-constrained framework for price discrimination).
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than their attention, and of preventing those individuals from arbi-
traging information they get at that price to users who value it
more highly and would be willing to pay. Since the only conse-
quence of developing such a category would be to enable the pro-
ducer to give its product away for free to those people, and only to
them, the producer is more likely simply to eliminate free distribu-
tion of its work rather than incur the cost that would allow it so to
distribute the work.
The necessary lumpiness of price discrimination and the
nonrivalry of information combine to alter the social welfare effects
commonly associated with price discrimination by monopolists. It is
easiest to grasp this difference if we separate out the social benefits
generated by the aspects of the work that are sold or licensed for a
price, and the social benefits of the aspects of the work that tech-
nology and law make available for privileged use, or in the public
domain, once the work is created. Imagine, in other words, that the
nonexcludable aspects of an information good are a beneficial by-
product of information production, which itself is carried on solely
in expectation of the benefits internalizable to the producer-sale of
access to the excludable aspects. 16 Now, this particular by-product
is not entirely external to the product, because there is some substi-
tutability between the excludable and nonexcludable aspects of a
work.
For any given state of law and technology, there is a ratio of
excludable to nonexcludable aspects of a work created, (e), such that
as (e) approaches 1, the work is almost perfectly excludable, and
vice versa. We can designate the supply of a work once created as
[I + I' ], where I represents the availability of the excludable as-
pects of the work, and I' represents the nonexcludable aspects of
the work. For any given work, the quantity of I supplied and (e) for
that work determines the quantity of I' generated as a by-product of
the provision of . Assume that I is provided solely in response to
expectations of direct appropriation-appropriation based on exer-
cise of the property rights that define the excludability of the good
under a given state of technology. 17 Producers fix the quantity of I
16. I have elsewhere explained why the assumption that information production is carried
on by all producers for the same reason-to extract benefits directly in reliance on legal rights-
is very partial, and that EPRIs are significantly less valuable, socially, than one predicts if one
assumes that all producers in fact do rely on them to appropriate the benefits of their production.
See Benkler, supra note 3.
17. This assumption gives EPRIs a stronger role as incentives for production than the em-
pirical literature justifies. See supra text accompanying note 16. Relaxing this assumption
would strengthen my claims here.
2000] 2073
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produced so as to sell it at a price that is their profit-maximizing
rate, given (e) and the substitutability of excludable and nonexclud-
able aspects of the work.
18
The social welfare generated by a work is the social welfare
generated by the availability of [I + I1. In other words, since I' is a
welfare-enhancing by-product of I, total social welfare generated by
the production of I at any level includes the welfare effects of both
the product and the by-product, even though the latter is a positive
externality from the perspective of the producer.
Graphically, Figure 2 represents the tradeoff embodied in
price discrimination when the welfare effects of the availability of






'1 12 Q Q
Figure 2: Welfare effects of price discrimination achieved by
increasing excludability
18. In other words, since nonexcludable aspects of the work may for some users substitute
for purchasing access to the work, the quantity of I to be produced also must take into account
consumers lost to I as a by-product of the production of L
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State 1, the top half of the figure, describes the sources of so-
cial welfare without price discrimination. Producers set the quan-
tity of information they produce at I, based on the level that maxi-
mizes their revenues. Given a state of law and technology, I and e
generate a given supply of I'. The social welfare generated by the
producer is equal to the welfare generated by sale of the excludable
aspects of the work (represented by the checkered area in the upper
left hand quadrant of Figure 2) plus the social welfare generated by
access to the nonexcludable aspects of the work for all those who
value the work at less than its above-marginal-cost market price
(represented by the checkered area in the upper right hand quan-
drant of Figure 2). The area shaded by diagonal lines in the upper
left hand quadrant represents the social welfare loss-the dead-
weight loss-to all those who value access to the excludable por-
tions of the work at more than its marginal cost, but less than its
market-cleared price.
The bottom half of the figure represents the social welfare ef-
fects of enabling price discrimination by improving the excludabil-
ity of information goods-through enforcement of contracts that
limit use rights and by supporting encryption. In the bottom left-
hand quadrant we see the effect argued in favor of laws that aid
price discrimination. By enabling a producer to offer I in two dis-
tinct packages (say, for commercial and noncommercial use), at two
distinct prices, each for a category produced at a certain quantity,
call them It and 12, the producer can eliminate some of the dead-
weight loss seen in the upper left-hand quadrant. However, as I ex-
plained in the text preceding the figures, price discrimination is not
perfect. The producer will not incur the costs of permitting free ac-
cess to uses that are nonexcludable under background law for con-
sumers who value such access at or below the cost of their attention
plus the cost of identifying them and preventing arbitrage from
them to higher-valuing users.
The social gain created by increasing excludability of infor-
mation goods so as to permit price discrimination is represented by
the move from the upper to lower left-hand quadrant. The social
loss caused by losing the social welfare effects of the availability of
free access to the nonexcludable aspects of the work is represented
by the move from the upper to lower right-hand quadrant. Whether
the former outweighs the latter or vice versa is an empirical ques-
tion that cannot be determined a priori.
To encapsulate the analysis, one might say that the social
welfare gain created by price discrimination as to a given informa-
tion good is generated by gains in the welfare of those who value
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that information substantially above its marginal cost. This in-
crease in social welfare is gained at the expense of the welfare lost
by users who value the information between the value of their at-
tention to it and that value plus an amount up to the vendor's cost
of identifying that category of users and preventing arbitrage from
them to higher value users, which is the lowest price at which the
information will be supplied under near-perfect price discrimina-
tion. Given that information is a true public good, access by users of
the latter variety is welfare enhancing, and its loss reduces social
welfare. The social welfare lost from elimination of access to previ-
ously non-excludable aspects of information goods works may or
may not outweigh the welfare gained from access to newly exclud-
able aspects of the work at a lower price than previously available.
From a social policy perspective the most interesting reasons
that might cause users not to be willing to pay enough to gain ac-
cess to a more perfectly excluded information good are: (a) high un-
certainty as to the value of any given piece of information; (b) high
positive externalities of a user's having a given piece of information;
or (c) hard budget constraints on paying for access to information
that would typify users who use information for noncommercial
reasons.
First, transformative users of the type whose use is most
likely to be considered "fair" under background copyright law 9 will
often require access to many pieces of information each of which
has a low probability of being the really useful information input in
the transformative process. While the value of the transformative
use might justify the time and effort spent in sifting through thou-
sands of potential information inputs, perhaps even paying a small
access fee to each of them, the willingness and ability to pay may be
very low, depending on how remote the probability that any given
piece of information, as opposed to the probability that some piece
out of all these pieces will be a valuable input. The more transfor-
mative the reworking of an existing information input, the less use-
ful the value of the input prior to the transformative reworking is
as a predictor of its value as input. This adds to the valuation un-
certainty for these kinds of uses.
19. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)
[T]he goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered
by the creation of transformative works. Such works thus lie at the heart of the
fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copy-
right, and the more transformative the new work, the less will be the signifi-
cance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of
fair use. (citation omitted).
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Second, work that is functionally equivalent to basic scien-
tific research-information production that has widespread basic
effects in its area, be it scientific, cultural (say, experimental thea-
tre), philosophical etc.-has very high social returns that cannot be
captured by the producer.2 0 High positive-externality productive
users are likely to underutilize existing information if they must
pay a price significantly above its marginal cost. They are therefore
likely to be part of those who generate social welfare by accessing
the nonexcludable aspects of the work, who would not be well-
served by increased access to the excludable aspects of the work in
exchange for loss of access to the nonexcludable aspects.
Third, producers who themselves produce for the public do-
main or otherwise for free distribution because they rely on means
other than assertion of rights to appropriate the benefits of their
production serve an important function of producing information
without the systematic inefficiencies that attend commercial pro-
duction for appropriation in reliance on EPRIs. Academics, non-
profit organizations, government/public education institutions, li-
brarians, etc., all provide important information production func-
tions. To pay the original producer, and thereby share the social
value they produce with it, these producers must themselves begin
to charge a price for access to their products, thereby limiting the
efficiency gains that these public providers of this public good-in-
formation-generate. 21
We are in the midst of a transformation in the way we regu-
late access to privately produced information. In the past we relied
heavily on publicly created rules, copyright, patent, etc., to solve
the problem of how to harness private enterprise to produce a pub-
lic good-information-without losing too many of the social bene-
fitp ;anerated by that public good. Driven by technological possibil-
ity and the political interests of those businesses that rely heavily
20. On the high positive externalities of basic science for commercial, as well as noncom-
mercial purposes, see Ralph Gomory, The Technology-Product Relationship: Early and Late
Stages, in TECHNOLOGY AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 383, 388 (Nathan Rosneberg et aL eds.,
1992); Richard R. Nelson, What is "Commercial" and What is "Public" About Technology, and
What Should Be? in TECHNOLOGY AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 57, 65-70 (Rosenberg et al. eds.,
1992); Richard R. Nelson, The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research, 67 J. POL. ECON.
297, 306 (1959); KENNETH ARROW, ECONOMIC WELFARE AND THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES IN
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTMTY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 623-25
(National Bureau of Econ. Research, 1962); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Intellectual Property at the
Public-Private Divide. The Case of Large-Scale eDNA Sequencing, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE
557 (1996).
21. See Benkler, supra note 3.
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on exclusive private rights in information, law has been moving to-
wards increasing the excludability of information goods. In par-
ticular, we are moving towards law that supports the displacement
of public determination of the scope and extent of exclusive private
rights to information by private determination of that scope
through a combination of technical control over the information and
legal enforcement of contracts that must be signed as a condition of
access to information so controlled. The most prominent expressions
of this trend are the DMCA and UCITA.
There are three primary economic justifications for the move
toward private ordering. The first, simplistic argument relies on the
notion that if technology makes possible perfect exclusion from in-
formation products, then market signals will operate to secure effi-
cient production of information. This argument is simply mistaken.
It confuses the possible elimination of the partial nonexcludability
of information goods with the elimination of the public goods prob-
lem of information. But information is a true public good. It is non-
rival, as well as nonexcludable. A perfect private market will ineffi-
ciently produce a good-like information-that is truly a public
good in the economic sense.
The second defense relies on the informational advantage
that private parties have over government officials who set the
background public rules regarding the allocation of control over ac-
cess to and use of information. It argues that private parties have
better information about what the most efficient allocation of price
and access is, and that by enforcing strong property rights, encryp-
tion, and contracts, we will permit private parties to make such de-
terminations for themselves. Property and contract here are seen as
a procedure for achieving a solution to the public goods problem not
because we think they can do so perfectly, but because they enable
the parties with the better information about the correct solution to
design the solution that seems best to them. This argument is not
wrong. But it ignores the fact that all transactions for information
goods negotiated on the background of EPRIs are negotiated in the
presence of market power. Creating power to price above marginal
cost is a necessary design feature of EPRIs. If EPRIs were designed
in a manner that failed to give their owners some power to control
price, they would fail, for the price of the information would be
driven to its marginal cost of zero, and the incentive effect of EPRIs
would be lost. In the presence of market power we have no system-
atic reason to think, a priori, that the terms of access negotiated
will be socially optimal, any more than we have reason to think that
the price of access will be socially optimal. Whether public or pri-
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vate ordering is preferable in this context therefore depends on a
comparison of the effect of the difference in information available
for certain transactions to government officials as compared to pri-
vate parties, and the effect of the market power on the deviation of
privately negotiated rules from the socially optimal rules. This may
be an empirically determinable question, but it is not determined as
a matter of theory by noting that private parties have better infor-
mation about their own interests than public officials. This argu-
ment is particularly ill-suited as a defense of enforcement of mass-
market clickwrap licenses, where the terms of exchange are not ne-
gotiated, but instead are set by vendors who do not have systemati-
cally better information about user preferences than do lawmaking
authorities.
Finally, the third defense relies on the idea that an informa-
tion product vendor who has market power will more efficiently
provide a good if it can price discriminate than if it cannot. Techni-
cal protection measures and contracts help vendors to price dis-
criminate, therefore the social welfare losses created by EPRIs can
be mitigated by introducing more efficient price discrimination.
This defense, like the previous one, is not wrong, but it is not de-
terminable as a matter of a priori theorizing. Because price dis-
crimination is costly to introduce, it will of necessity be lumpy, not
smooth. Introducing such imperfect price discrimination will re-
quire enhancing the excludability of information goods, and
whether price discrimination increases overall social welfare will
depend on whether the gains from enhanced consumer access to the
excludable aspects of the work will outweigh the social losses
caused by elimination or reduction in free access to the previously
nonexcludable aspects of the work. There is no reason to think that
price discrimination will always improve aggregate social welfare,
or that it will do so in all sectors for all manner of means of exclu-
sion. Sometimes it will, sometimes it will not, and telling which is
which is a matter of empirical, not theoretical work.
There is, then, no general theoretical reason to think that
private ordering of information transactions will systematically en-
hance aggregate social welfare, relative to public ordering of such
transactions. There are, on the other hand, many reasons to think
that increasing the excludability of information goods will impose
significant costs on public discourse and on personal autonomy.
Given these two facts about the state of our knowledge, it is impos-
sible to determine whether the current trend towards making in-
formation more perfectly excludable is a rational public-regarding
action. The actual perceived behavior of lawmakers is more likely a
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function of the political economy of exclusive private rights in in-
formation. 22 Increasing excludability enhances the welfare of own-
ers of information goods, and these owners lobby for expanding
rights. Those whose welfare is adversely affected are usually too
diffuse to represent the full measure of the social loss, thereby pre-
senting legislatures with a skewed picture of the social effects of
perfecting the excludability of information goods. Perhaps, then, it
is up to publicly spirited legislators, but even more so to judges, to
serve as counterweight to these political imbalances, to review very
carefully, and with a skeptical eye, proposals for further enclosure
of the public domain.
22. I have described this political economy elsewhere. See Benkler, Constitutional Bounds,
supra note 4.
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